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Peking Rejects Proposal for Flexible Agenda: Chinese comment on the Panmunjom talks continues to reiterate the Communist position that success or failure of the political conference hinges on preliminary determination of the conference's membership. Peking charges that a conference held between the two belligerents alone would surely be frustrated by American obstruction. Communist inflexibility concerning an agenda for the Panmunjom meeting is reflected in the rejection of Ambassador Dean's proposal for a "flexible agenda." The U.S. plan for a flexible agenda is deemed no improvement on America's previous agenda proposals. NCNA commentator Kiang Nan dismisses the parallel U.S. offer to exchange views without attempting to make a final settlement on the participation issue as "no better than no talks at all." Kiang Nan's assertion is in contrast to the bulk of Peking comment which continues to affirm that the U.S. delegate consistently refuses even to discuss the composition issue.

There is apparent concern over the effect of Ambassador Dean's optimistic statements outside the conference in charges that these statements are unfounded and designed solely to deceive world opinion as to the true nature of American obstruction. It can hardly be imagined, Kiang Nan asserts, that intransigent American obstruction of the composition issue can be changed suddenly. This attempt by the Communists to place all responsibility for possible failure of the meetings on the Americans is probably intended to counterbalance their failure to discuss more fully the announced U.S. willingness to exchange views on the composition question.

U.S. Fabricates BW Refutation Testimony: A 31 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial provides the first Peking acknowledgment of current American refutations of Communist bacterial warfare charges. The editorial points to the insignificant amount of evidence--the "self-contradictory" statements by ten U.S. airmen--introduced by the United States and juxtaposes this with the "mountain of evidence" compiled by the Communist nations over a period of years. Leading statements and investigations used in previous Communist BW campaigns are reviewed in the editorial. The Chinese radio further charges that the testimony forming the basis of the U.S. presentation was "fabricated under the coercion of the American Government," and offers in support of this charge statements by leading American officials, including Attorney General Brownell and Defense Secretary Wilson, threatening treason trials and court martials of returned prisoners guilty of supporting the Communists. An effort is also made to defend the confessions originally made by the same airmen while in Communist hands. The airmen's own statements concerning the humane treatment while in Communist hands are cited to refute U.S. charges that torture was used to extract the confessions.

While Peking makes a greater effort to revive the claims of the BW campaigns of the past than does Moscow, Chinese broadcasts support the Soviet U.N. resolution which avoids debate on the BW issue and which instead calls for ratification of the Geneva Protocol. These broadcasts also imply that

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little Communist rebuttal is necessary inasmuch as the U.S. charges were received "coldly" in the U.N. The customary Chinese demand for representation in the U.N. debates on the issue is not revived.

Current claims that the U.S. chose to "force" BW on the U.N. agenda at this time in order to divert world attention from the U.S. plot to undermine the political conference also suggest that the Communists do not intend to devote extensive propaganda attention to U.N. deliberations on BW at the present moment.

In contrast to Peking's detailed denunciation of U.S. refutation of BW charges, Chinese broadcasts have contained only a paragraph reference to the "concocted" report on torture and murder prepared by the Army Department. Peking makes no additional original comment on the nature of this report, but on 3 November cites a London DAILY WORKER editorial as charging that the Americans will never permit an impartial investigation of the charges and that the report has been released only to sabotage the political conference.

Communists Demand Extended Explanation Period: The subject of prisoner repatriation continues to receive maximum attention--20 percent of total Peking volume--which indicates Peking's continued concern with the propaganda potential of this issue. This concern seems particularly focused on the alleged American obstruction of the repatriation process which the Communists charge is intended to nullify the explanation period and bring about the release of the prisoners in January at the expiration of the time limit provided in the armistice. In an apparent effort to gain the upper hand or at the least to provide a convenient explanation for Communist failure to effect the return of most of the prisoners, Peking renews its bid to secure an extension of the explanation period to provide a full 90 days of explanations. This demand is contained in a Communist communique of 1 November and is echoed in a 3 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Success of the Communist plan would give the Chinese an opportunity to delay indefinitely the completion of explanations, and resultingly, the ultimate release of the prisoners as well.

Indian Firmness Welcomed by Prisoners: Successful Indian intervention in the Chinese prisoner compound on 2 November to investigate the murder of several prisoners is hailed as confirmation of the existence of agent terror in the prison compounds. The "firm" action of the Indians is also seized upon by Peking as proving "beyond a shadow of a doubt" that the POWs "will not oppose the Indian custodian troops" and are in fact waiting for just such an opportunity to "free themselves from agent control." Tientsin's TA KUNG PAO observes promptly on 3 November that the "lessons" of this investigation "point to a correct approach for the NNRC" in the future.

Prior to this Indian action, the Chinese Communists had accused the Indians of "deliberate exaggeration" or at best of "miscalculation" in predicting that resort to force would result in heavy bloodshed. The opposition of the Swiss and Swedish NNRC members to the use of force was even

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more violently denounced in Communist broadcasts and they were openly accused of becoming "U.S. spokesmen" in the plot to forcibly retain prisoners. Peking affirmed repeatedly that "every self-respecting neutral nation" must face the issue of American-inspired obstruction in the compounds and "take the necessary action." Concerning the investigation of alleged murders in the compounds, the Communist delegate to the armistice commission, Lee Sang Cho, had insisted that the culprits must first be arrested and then the facts could be ascertained unhindered.

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